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1 Introduction
Applications that can cause risks for human lives or risk of great financial
losses are usually made fault-tolerant [1], so that they are capable of providing
their intended service, even if only partially, when errors occur. Fault-tolerant
systems include mechanisms for detecting errors in their states and recovering
from these errors. There are two main types of error recovery [1]: backward
error recovery (based on rolling the system back to the previous correct state)
and forward error recovery (which involves transforming the system into any
correct state). The former usually uses either diversely implemented software
or simple retry; the latter is typically application-specific and relies on an
exception handling mechanism [2,3].
Usually, a significant part of the system code is devoted to error detection
and handling [2,4]. In 1989, Cristian [2] claimed that, for telephone switching
applications, this part of the code often amounted to more than two thirds
of the overall system code. A more recent study [4] involving a set of open-
source applications written in Java discovered that between 1 and 5% of the
program texts consisted of exception handlers (catch blocks) and clean-up
actions (finally blocks). In another study [5] whose targets were five large-
scale applications based on the Java Enterprise Edition [6] platform, the rate
between number of exception handlers and number of operations in each ap-
plication varied between 0,058 and 1,79. Finally, some of us have conducted
yet another study [7] involving four applications, two produced in industry
and two in academia. In this case the rates between number of handlers and
number of operations varied between 0,099% and 0,208%.
In spite of the pervasiveness of error detection and handling code, this part
of the code is usually the least understood, tested, and documented [2] in a
system. This is due mainly to the fact that developers tend to focus on the
normal activity of applications and only deal with the code responsible for
error detection and handling at the implementation phase. In distributed sys-
tems, several issues aggravate this situuation, for example, the high cost of
reaching an agreement, absence of a global view on the system state, multi-
ple concurrent errors, difficulties in ensuring error isolation, etc. These factors
complicate the development of reliable systems in general and of the mech-
anisms that make them reliable, in particular. The overall result is that the
parts of a system responsible for making it reliable are usually the source of
design faults [2,5,4].
In order for a system to achieve the desired levels of reliability, mechanisms for
detecting and handling errors should be applied systematically from the early
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phases of development [8]. Moreover, the construction of these fault tolerance
mechanisms should follow a rigorous or formal development methodology [9].
In this manner, these mechanisms are made more reliable and do not introduce
new fault in the system.
1.1 Problem
The Coordinated Atomic (CA) Actions concept [10] results from combining
distributed transactions and atomic actions. Atomic actions are used to control
cooperative concurrency and to implement exception handling [11] whilst dis-
tributed transactions [12] are used to maintain the consistency of the resources
shared by competing actions. CA actions function as exception handling con-
texts for cooperative systems and exceptions raised in an action are handled
cooperatively by all the action’s participants. If two or more exceptions are
concurrently raised, an exception resolution mechanism [11] is employed to
find an exception to be handled that represents all the exceptions raised con-
currently (a resolved exception). Many case studies [13–16] have shown that
CA actions are a powerful and useful tool for structuring large, distributed
fault-tolerant systems. In this paper, we use coordinated atomic actions as a
representive of mechanisms for exception handling in distributed systems.
In order for CA actions to be applicable in the construction of complex, real-
world systems with strict dependability requirements, software development
based on CA actions has to be supported by rigorous models, techniques, and
tools. Several approaches have been proposed for formalizing the CA action
concept with the intention either to give a more complete and rigorous descrip-
tion of the concept [17] or to verify CA action-based designs [15]. However,
an important aspect of CA actions that has not been properly addressed by
existing work is coordinated exception handling. This is surprising, since ex-
ception handling complements other techniques for improving reliability, such
as atomic transactions, and promotes the implementation of specialized and
sophisticated error recovery measures. Moreover, in some distributed applica-
tions, a rollback is not possible or is prohibitively expensive. In this scenario,
exception handling may be the only reasonable choice available.
Some authors [18] claim that mechanisms for involving multiple participants
in order to cooperatively handle exceptiong are difficult to both implement
and use. However, we believe that programmers will make more mistakes in
an ad hoc implementation of cooperative exception handling than in apply-
ing the well-defined mechanisms that general frameworks such as CA actions
provide. Therefore, techniques and tools that mitigate the inherent complex-
ity of exception handling in a concurrent setting and help developers in the
specification and design of systems that make use of this feature are required.
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In this paper, we examine the problem of specifying CA action-based designs
in a way that allows us to automatically verify if they exhibit certain proper-
ties of interest pertaining to coordinated exception handling. We attempt to
understand the requirements of an approach to model exception propagation
and handling in these designs. Comprehension and documentation of exception
propagation in non-concurrent software systems is by itself a complex issue
and an active research theme [19–23]. Concurrency is a strong complicating
factor for exception propagation. In CA action-based designs, a participant
can not only raise and handle exceptions, but also spawn new actions which
are, themselves, exception handling contexts involving multiple participants.
A factor that further aggravates matters is the possibility of two or more ex-
ceptions being concurrently raised inside an action. A model of the actions and
their participants must contemplate every possible combination of exceptions
or, at least, explicitly indicate combinations that cannot happen in practice.
Moreover, it should make it possible to specify how participants react when
faced with different sets of concurrently raised exceptions. Finally, since excep-
tion handling is strongly related with action structuring, it should also model
the nesting and composition [14] of CA actions and how this affects exception
propagation and handling.
1.2 Proposed Approach
In this paper, we present an approach for modeling CA action-based designs
that makes it possible to automatically verify these models using a constraint
solver. The main component of the proposed approach is a formal model of CA
actions that specifies the structuring of a system in terms of actions, as well as
information relative to exception flow amongst these actions. This model can
be directly specified using well-known specification languages, like Alloy [24]
and B [25], and automatically verified using the tool sets associated with these
languages. With the proposed approach, it is possible to check whether a CA-
action based software system satisfies several properties of interest.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background
on CA actions, the B method and notation, and the Alloy specification lan-
guage. Section 3 presents the proposed approach, including a description of the
generic CA actions model and some of the properties that it helps verifying.
Section 4 formalizes the basic properties of the generic CA actions model. We
then illustrate the feasibility and usefulness of the proposed approach through
two case studies. Section 6 reviews related work and the last section rounds
the paper and points directions for future work.
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2 Background
In this section we provide some background information on some topics that
are important for the comprehension of the rest of the paper. First we in-
troduce CA actions, a scheme for organizing fault-tolerant concurrent systems
that employ exception handling. We then proceed to describe two formal spec-
ification languages, Alloy [24] and B [25]. These languages are examples of for-
mal notations that one can use in combination with the approach we propose
in this paper in order to specify and verify some properties of fault-tolerant
distributed systems based on CA actions. Both are similar to Z [26], declara-
tive in nature, and supported by automated verification tools. It is important
to stress, however, that they were designed with very different goals in mind.
2.1 Coordinated Atomic Actions
CA actions are a unified scheme for coordinating complex concurrent activi-
ties and supporting error recovery between multiple interacting components.
It promotes a decrease in the overall system complexity and simplifies devel-
opment by structuring the system in terms of nested recovery units. A CA
action is designed as a set of roles cooperating inside it and a set of resources
accessed by them. An action starts when its roles are taken by participants. A
participant abstracts away the underlying unit of concurrency, i.e., it can be
a process, a thread, an active object, or any similar mechanism. In the course
of the action, participants can access external resources. The latter must be
accessed according to the ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability)
properties and must provide means for these properties to be enforced. Action
participants either reach the end of the action and produce a normal outcome
or are involved in coordinated handling, if one or more exceptions are raised
within the action. If handling is successful the action completes by producing
a normal outcome.
The CA action scheme enforces a clear difference between internal exceptions
(which are raised in the action and have handlers inside the action) and exter-
nal exceptions, which are signaled outside the action when the action cannot
deliver the expected results. The latter are used to report partial action out-
comes, abort effect, failure to achieve a consistent result by action participants,
etc. Internal exceptions are encapsulated in the action, whereas external ones
are visible in the action interface as they have to be dealt with by the contain-
ing action. When several exceptions are concurrently raised in a CA action,
an exception resolution mechanism is used to define a resolved exception that
represents all the exceptions that were raised. The resolved exception is then
handled cooperatively by all the action roles. Exception resolution uses a data
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Fig. 1. A CA action example.
structure named exception resolution graph, that maps sets of exceptions that
can be concurrently raised to resolved exceptions. When an action cannot han-
dle a resolved exception, its roles attempts to perform backward error recovery.
If they succeed, the action is said to have aborted, because the system is still
left in a consistent state. If the roles are unable to perform backward error
recovery, the action fails and no guarantees can be made about the state of
the system. In both cases, an exception is signaled to the enclosing context in
order to indicate that the action did not perform as expected.
Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of a simple system structured
using CA actions. This diagram shows how the units of computation in a
system interact and the information that they exchange along time. Top-
level CA action A1 has three roles performed by participants P1, P2, and P3.
Participants P2 and P3 also perform roles R4 and R5, respectively, in the nested
CA action A2. A nested action defines an exception handling context within
an enclosing action and serves as a finer-grained damage confinement region.
Role R5 of A2 spawns composed CA action A3 at some point in time before
the completion of A2. R5 is interrupted from the moment A3 starts until it
completes. Composed actions are started by roles in order to perform specific
tasks and their life-cycles are bound to their spawning roles’. The internal
exceptions of an action are represented by small squares (labeled E1, E2, E3,
and E4 in the figure). Each exception is placed near the role that raises it.
The choice of fault tolerance error recovery approach to be exploited for the
development of dependable systems depends very much on the fault assump-
tions and on the system characteristics and requirements. In spite of all its
advantages, backward error recovery has a limited applicability. Modern sys-
tems are increasingly relying on forward error recovery which uses appropriate
exception handling techniques as the chief technique [2,27]. Examples of such
applications are complex systems involving human beings, COTS components,
external devices, several organizations, movement of goods, operations on the
environment, real-time systems that do not have time to go back. Service-
oriented architectures also fall clearly into this category [27]. The CA actions
provide a valuable conceptual tool to develop these systems.
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2.2 The B Method
B is, at the same time, a formal development method and a modeling nota-
tion [25]. A formal B specification is a mathematical model of the required
behavior of a system or its part, represented by a collection of modules, called
abstract machines. An abstract machine encapsulates a local state (local vari-
ables) and provides operations (events). The occurrence of events represents
the observable behaviour of the system. The event guard defines the condi-
tions under which the body can be executed. B statements used to describe the
body of the events are a mixture of executable statements (e.g., assignments
or conditional statements) and abstract statements that use mathematical op-
erations over sets and functions. We provide examples and explanations about
the B notation where appropriate in the following sections.
The B Method supports top-down system development. In the development
process, the abstract specification is transformed into an implementation via a
number of correctness-preserving steps, called refinements. Correctness of each
refinement step is validated by proofs, so that for each refinement step the B
method generates a number correctness conditions, called proof obligations,
that should be proved true to guarantee that the refined system satisfies (pre-
serves) all the specified properties. B models can also be subject to automated
analysis (model checking) through the use of the ProB constraint solver [28].
However, since ProB uses undecidable logics, automated model verification
must have a bounded scope in order to guarantee that verification stops.
We have chosen to use B as a specification language in this work in order
to materialize the system model that we propose in Sections 3 and 4. This
system model comprises three components: the elements of CA action-based
software systems, relations and functions that connect and add information
to these elements, and predicates that define rules to which valid systems
must adhere. Some features of the B notation have influenced this choice.
First, it supports the definition of both the types of the elements in a system
and their instances. Moreover, both structural (actions, roles, participants)
and data (exceptions) elements can be modeled as typed entities. Second,
it is expressive enough to specify the formal model that we present in Sec-
tion 4, including the more convoluted predicates including transitive closures
and high-order relations. Third, there is a large number of tools that support
software development based on B, both entirely automated and interactive.
Fourth, it supports the approach we employ to structure specifications. This
approach is similar to software development based on object-oriented frame-
works: part of a system consists of reusable code and design (in our case,
reusable specification elements and predicates) whereas the rest of the system
(specification) is application-specific. The two parts are connected by the ex-
tension mechanisms provided by the underlying programming (specification)
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language.
2.3 Alloy Specification Language
Alloy [24] is a lightweight specification language for software design. It is
amenable to a fully automatic analysis, using the Alloy Analyzer (AA) [29],
and provides a visualizer for making sense of solutions and counterexamples
it finds. Alloy is based on first-order relational logic and, similarly to other
specification languages, such as Z [26], supports complex data structures and
declarative models. Alloy aims to be a language for prototyping and verifica-
tion, built from the start with automated verification in mind. In fact, Alloy
was created with the goal of devising the simplest formal language that could
still support the creation of useful models. In this sense, it differs from Z, a
more expressive language whose main goal is to support (interactive) theorem
proving.
In Alloy, models are analyzed within a given scope, or size (the maximum
number of instances of a type). The analysis performed by the AA is sound,
since it never returns false positives. However, similarly to B, verification of
Alloy models is incomplete because the AA only checks things up to a certain
scope. However, it is complete up to the selected scope, i.e., the AA never
misses a counterexample which is smaller than the specified scope. As pointed
out by the Alloy tutorial [30], small scope checks are still useful for finding
errors. We provide examples and explanations about the Alloy notation where
appropriate in the following sections.
The use of Alloy in the specification and verification of software systems has
many benefits, for example: (i) it is a very simple language whose semantics is
based on first-order relational logic; (ii) its syntax is easy to learn for develop-
ers used to object-oriented languages; (iii) very fast constraint solver; and (v)
the graphical counter-examples produced by the AA are easy to understand,
at least for small systems, specially when compared to execution traces. Its
main disadvantage is lack of expressiveness. Due to its design goals, the lan-
guage lacks several useful constructs for specifying systems, Examples include
a notion of function and high-order relations. We understand that these con-
straints aim to simplify automated verification, but they limit the ability of
developers to specify real systems. In Section 5.2, we describe an example situ-
ation where this limited expressiveness made it difficult to apply the proposed
approach.
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3 Proposed Approach
The construction of robust fault-tolerant systems requires that developers take
fault tolerance-related issues into account since the early phases of develop-
ment. Our ultimate goal is to devise a general approach for the rigorous de-
velopment of dependable distributed systems that use both cooperative and
competitive concurrency. This work addresses specifically the issue of verify-
ing properties of interest related to system structuring and coordinated excep-
tion handling in CA action-based designs. The rest of this section presents an
overview of the proposed approach and briefly describes some of the properties
that it helps in verifying.
3.1 Overview
Figure 2 presents a schematic description of the proposed approach for veri-
fying CA action-based software systems. Developers start by performing tra-
ditional activities of a software development process, namely, analysis and
design of the system, assuming that the system is concurrent and coopera-
tive. At the same time, they define the scenarios in which the system may fail
(fault model), what exceptions correspond to each type of error, and where
and how the exceptions are handled (exceptional activity). The specification
of the system’s fault model and exceptional activity can be conducted as pre-
scribed by some works in the literature [8]. The result of these activities is
a model of the CA action-based system. This model indicates the exceptions
that can be raised in each CA action and how they are handled. It is written
in a language for modeling CA actions, for example, informal diagrams (as
presented in Figure 1), the Coala [17] formal language, or the FTT-UML [31]
profile for the UML.
To verify the CA action-based design, it is necessary to translate it to a spec-
ification language having an operational semantics allowing for formal verifi-
cation of properties. Moreover, in accordance to the proposed approach, the
language should allow the definition of both data and structural elements as
typed entities that can be subtyped. Hereafter, for short, we call languages
that meet these criteria verification languages. If the language for modeling
CA actions has a well-defined semantics, like Coala, this translation can be
completely automated by a tool. The translation can also be automated for in-
formal notations, like UML profiles, but only partially (syntactically). Usually,
some manual intervention is required to resolve ambiguities. Developers more
familiar with formal methods can write the system descriptions directly in a
verification language. In the rest of this paper, we adopt this approach. The
choice of using one or two specification languages is based solely on usability
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Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed approach. White rectangles represent activities
and shaded rectangles with dashed borders represent artifacts.
issues.
The formal specification that is produced by translating the CA action-based
design to the verification language must adhere to a generic CA actions meta-
model specifying the main concepts of CA actions and how they relate (here-
after called generic CA actions model). In summary, this model describes
an exception handling mechanism based on CA actions, focusing on how ex-
ceptions flow amongst the system components. The next section provides an
overview of the generic CA actions model. Both the formal specification and
the generic CA actions model are described in the verification language. Up
to now, we have specified generic CA actions models using B and Alloy as
verification languages [32]. Developers can use either of them to formalize
CA action-based designs (but not both simultaneously). The goal of having
two different verification languages is to show that the proposed approach is
language-agnostic. Therefore, a developer intending to employ our approach
would need to choose only one of them or define a generic CA actions model
for yet another formal notation.
A system is verified by providing its formal specification as input to a con-
straint solver for the verification language, together with the properties to be
verified. These properties are predicates that must be true for the system to
be considered well-defined or well-designed. They are specified in terms of the
elements of the generic CA actions model, in order to be applicable to any
system description adhering to it. We have used the AA and ProB constraint
solvers to verify formal specifications in Alloy and B, respectively. If any of the
properties of interest does not hold, the constraint solver produces a counterex-
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ample. Both constraint solvers, besides generating a counterexample, include
a graphic visualizer that provides additional help in the identification of the
problem.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the last three activities of Figure 2,
namely, “Translate CA action-based design to verification language”(assuming
that the model of the system is written directly in the verification language),
“Specify properties of interest” and “Verify if the formal specification satis-
fies the properties”. These activities are the ones directly related to system
verification.
3.2 Generic CA Actions Model
The generic CA actions model formally defines an exception handling mecha-
nism for CA action-based systems. This model can be instantiated by systems
adhering to it so that certain properties pertaining to the structure of and the
flow of exceptions in the system can be automatically verified. It is generic in
the sense that it does not depend on specific tools, formalisms, or approaches
to verification. As mentioned in the previous section, up to now, we have spec-
ified generic CA actions models using B and Alloy as verification languages.
For verification, we employed the constraints solvers available for these lan-
guages. Another option would be to build a specific verification tool based on
the model, instead of using preexisting, general purpose constraint solvers. The
trade-off, in this case, is between performance (of verification) and flexibility
(to specify new properties that must be verified).
In our view, the structure of a system is a hierarchy of actions that contain
nested actions and roles. Roles are performed by participants, units of com-
putation such as threads and processes, and can compose additional actions
that only make sense in the context of the spawning role. Hence, the main
elements of the generic CA actions model are actions, roles, participants, and
exceptions. These elements are represented by objects of a certain type. The
proposed model employs a notion of type that is compatible with the notion
of types used in OO languages such as Java and C#. A type T is a set of
instances and its subtypes T1, T2, ..., TN of T are disjoint subsets of T . Only
single inheritance is allowed.
Table 1 lists the elements of the proposed generic CA actions model, the main
concepts used in the definition of CA actions. An exception is any instance
of type RootException, or some of its subtypes. The same applies to actions,
roles, and participants, and the types Action, Role, and Participant, respec-
tively. We assume that instances of these types are uniquely identified by
their names. The sets in the table can also be seen as unary relations and are,
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Table 1
Basic elements of the proposed model.
Element Description
Action Type that defines actions.
Role Type that defines roles of actions.
Participant Type that defines participants.
RootException Type that defines exceptions.
therefore, subject to operations that apply to relations, such as composition.
We represent exceptions as objects, instead of using symbols or global vari-
ables, mainly because objects are more flexible and can be used to encode ar-
bitrary information regarding the cause of an exception [33]. Also, many large
and complex software systems are developed nowadays using object-oriented
languages, such as Java and C++, which represent exceptions as objects. Ad-
ditionally, we avoided choosing a more usual name to the supertype of all
exceptions, such as Exception or Error, in order to provide developers with
the flexibility to organize exceptions as required, for instance, based on the
adopted programming language. For example, considering the exception han-
dling mechanism of Java, a developer should define at least four exception
types: (i) Throwable, subtype of RootException; (ii) Exception, subtype of
Throwable; (iii) Error, subtype of Throwable; and (iv) RuntimeException,
subtype of Exception. An application-specific exception type would then be
a subtype of one of these types.
Additional information is associated to the elements of Table 1 through rela-
tions (sometimes functions). For example, the set of roles of an action is defined
by the Roles ∈ Action × Role relation, which associates actions to their re-
spective roles. The proposed model defines 16 different relations that specify
three different aspects of a CA action-based software system: (i) system struc-
ture; (ii) exception flow; and (iii) exception resolution. The well-formedness
of an system adhering to the model is dictated by a set of predicates, or basic
properties, defined in terms of these relations and the elements of the model.
Section 3.3 provides some examples of basic properties. Section 4 presents a
formalization of the generic CA actions model.
The relationship between the generic CA actions model and a system descrip-
tion adhering to it is similar to the relationship between an object-oriented
framework and a system that instantiates it. The former defines specific points
where it can be extended. In the generic CA actions model, the extension
points comprise the types corresponding to the elements of CA action-based
systems (basic types). System descriptions instantiate the model by using ele-
ment types that extend (in the sense of object-oriented inheritance) the basic
types. Since the properties of interest are specified in terms of the elements
of the generic CA actions model, the aforementioned relations and predicates
also apply to system descriptions adhering to the generic CA actions model.
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This is similar to a method in an OO language that has a parameter of a type
T but also accepts parameters of a type T ′, subtype of T . This approach sepa-
rates the tasks of specifying a generic CA actions model (performed only once
for each verification language) from the task of specifying a system and pro-
motes reuse of properties of interest and system specifications. Nevertheless,
a developer still needs to understand the generic CA model in order to specify
a system. Section 5 provides two examples of instantiation of the generic CA
actions model.
3.3 Properties of Interest
The properties of interest that a system must satisfy are split in three cat-
egories: basic, desired, and application-specific. Basic properties define the
well-formedness rules of the model, the characteristics of valid CA actions.
They specify the coordinated exception handling mechanism and how actions
are organized. Examples of basic properties are presented below, stated infor-
mally.
BPA. If a participant performs a role in a nested action, it must also perform
some role in the containing action. Participants are units of computation
(threads, processes) that perform roles in CA actions. In theory, any par-
ticipant can perform a role in a top-level CA action. However, for a nested
CA action, the definition of CA actions requires that only participants that
perform roles in the containing CA action perform roles in the nested one.
BPB. No cycles in action nesting. This property states that the organization
of the actions in the system is hierarchical and the graph formed by the
definitions of the actions (including their nested and composed actions) has
no cycles.
BPC. The exception resolution mechanism of an action resolves all possible
combinations of concurrent internal exceptions, unless explicitly stated oth-
erwise. This property guarantees that every possible combination of concur-
rently raised exceptions is contemplated by the exception resolution graph
of each CA action. Some of these combinations must be resolvable by the
mechanism. The resolution graph must also explicitly account for the com-
binations of concurrently raised exceptions can happen in theory, but not
in practice.
Desired properties are general properties that are usually considered benefi-
cial, although they are not part of the basic mechanism of CA actions. They
describe important requirements that most fault-tolerant software systems
should meet. In general, desired properties are based on the assumption that
the basic properties hold. Some examples are the following.
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DPA. Top-level CA actions have no external exceptions. This property states
that the system is, in fact, fault-tolerant. It specifies that all the exceptions
that reach top-level (non-nested, non-composed) CA actions are handled by
these actions and the latter do not signal any exceptions. This guarantees
that the system never fails catastrophically due to unhandled exceptions.
The Ariane-5 control system [34] is a classic example of a system that failed
to meet this desirable property (it failed due to an uncaught exception),
resulting in a very expensive accident.
DPB. All internal exceptions of an action are handled in it and no exceptions
are propagated as a consequence. This is a desirable property that is hard
to meet in practice. It states that a system adheres to the principle that an
error should be handled as close a possible to its detection site [1]. For CA
actions, it means that every action in the system is capable of handling all
the internal exceptions that can result from exception resolution within the
action, effectively masking their occurrence from the enclosing CA action.
Application-specific properties are rules about the flow of exceptions in a
specific CA action-based application. We present an example of application-
specific property in Section 5.2. The generic CA actions models we have spec-
ified so far include the specifications of several basic and desired properties
that can be used “as-is”. Developers only specify additional desired properties
and application-specific properties, if any.
In the rest of this section, we present some examples of properties of interest
written in Alloy. As mentioned in Section 3.1, it is necessary to specify the
properties of interest in a verification language in order to verify a CA action-
based design. Properties of interest do not, however, inherently depend on
any specific language. A verification language is necessary, though, to leverage
generic constraint solvers, such as ProB and the AA, for verification. Therefore,
the examples we present in the rest of the section could also have been written
in B or, as we show in the next section, in a language-agnostic manner, with
no significant difference. The following snippet presents a formal specification
of property BPA in Alloy.
predicate parts_ok() {
(all A:Action| (all NA:A.NestedActions|
all NAR:NA.Roles |
!(all P:Participant|!(NAR in P.RolesPlayed
&& some (P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles)))))
}
This snippet defines an Alloy predicate named parts ok. Alloy predicates are
logic sentences that must be checked by the AA. In the body of the predi-
cate, Roles, NestedActions, and RolesPlayed are names of some relations
that associate information to the elements of the system. The “.” operator
represents relational composition (or join). More formally, given two relations
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A ⊆ T1 × T2 × ...× Tn and B ⊆ Tn × Tn+1 × ...× Tn+m, A.B yields a relation
C ⊆ T1 × T2 × ... × Tn−1 × Tn+1 × ... × Tn+m. Relation C comprises all the
tuples formed by combining tuples from A and B whenever the last element of
a tuple from A is the same as the first element of a tuple from B. For example,
given A = {(e1, e2), (e2, e3)} and B = {(e2, e4), (e2, e5), (e3, e6), (e7, e8)}, A.B
yields C = {(e1, e4), (e1, e5), (e2, e6)}. In the Alloy predicate presented above,
A.NestedActions yields the set of actions nested within action A, assuming
that A ∈ Action, where Action is a type, and NestedActions is a relation
associating actions to their nested actions. Predicate parts ok states that
every role of every nested action is performed by some participant that also
performs some role in the enclosing action. The operators all, !, &&, and &
represent, respectively, universal quantifier, logical negation, logical conjunc-
tion, and set intersection. The some keyword yields true if its argument is a
non-empty set.
The following snippet shows a formal specification in Alloy for property DPA.
all A1:Action | ((all A2:Action |
!(A1 in A2.NestedActions)) && (all R:Role |
!(A1 in R.ComposedActions))) =>
(no A1.External)
This snippet states that all actions that are not nested within some other
action and not composed by some role (i.e. top-level CA actions) have no
external exceptions. Operator => represents logical implication.
4 Formalization of the Generic CA Actions Model
In this section, we formally specify the basic properties of the generic CA
actions model, using a combination of basic set theory and relational logic.
This formalization is compatible with both B and Alloy. In the latter case, it
requires some minor adjustments, due to the inability of Alloy to specify high-
order quantifications (Section 5.2). The presentation comprises three aspects
of CA action-based software systems: (i) system structure; (ii) exception flow;
and (iii) exception resolution. These aspects are explained in Sections 4.1, 4.2,
and 4.3, respectively.
4.1 System Structure
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we consider the structure of a system to be a
hierarchy of actions that contain nested actions and roles. System structure is
specified in terms of four relations:
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Table 2
Properties that define the valid structuring of a CA action-based system.
Property Constraint
BP1 ∀A ∈ Action • |{A}.Roles| > 0
BP2 ran(Roles) =ran(RolesP layed)
BP3 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀P ∈ Participant • |{P}.RolesP layed
⋂
{A}.Roles| ≤ 1
BP4 ∀R ∈ Role • |Roles.{R}| = 1
BP5 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀NA ∈ {A}.NestedActions • ∀NAR ∈ {NA}.Roles•
∃P ∈ Participant •NAR ∈ {P}.RolesP layed ∧
{P}.RolesP layed
⋂
{A}.Roles 6= {}
BP6 ∀CA ∈ (Action.Roles).ComposedActions • ∀P ∈ Participant•
{P}.RolesP layed
⋂
{CA}.Roles 6= {} ⇒ ¬(∃A ∈ Action •A 6= CA ∧
{A}.Roles
⋂
{P}.RolesP layed 6= {} ∧ A /∈ {CA}. ∗NestedActions)
BP7 ran(NestedActions)
⋂
ran(ComposedActions) = {}
BP8 ∀A ∈ Action •A /∈ {A}. ∗ (˜(Roles.ComposedActions
⋃
NestedActions))
• Roles ∈ Action ↔ Role
• NestedActions ∈ Action ↔ Action
• RolesP layed ∈ Participant ↔ Role
• ComposedActions ∈ Role ↔ Action
Given an action A (an instance of type Action), the expressions {A}.Roles
and {A}.NestedActions yield, respectively, the set of roles of action A and
the set of actions nested within A. Similarly, given a participant P and a role
R, {P}.RolesP layed and {R}.ComposedActions yield, respectively, the set of
roles that P performs and the set of actions that R composes, if any. Table 2
lists some constraints on relations Roles, NestedActions, RolesP layed, and
ComposedActions. These constraints specify properties that a system speci-
fication adhering to the generic CA actions model should exhibit. Each one
is identified by a name matching the pattern BPX, where “BP” stands for
basic property and “X” is a positive integer. Properties BP1, BP2, BP3, and
BP4 specify fundamental constraints, respectively: (1) every action has at
least one role; (2) every role of every action is performed by some participant;
(3) a participant plays at most one role in any given action; (4) each role is
part of exactly one action. In the table, the “ran” operator yields the range
of a relation. Property BP5 specifies that all the roles in a nested action are
performed by participants who also play some role in the enclosing action.
It is a language-agnostic formalization of property BPA, specified both both
informally and formally (in Alloy) in Section 3.3. BP6 specifies a similar con-
straint that targets specifically composed actions. It states that participants
that perform roles in a composed action only perform roles in other actions if
the latter are nested within the composed action.
BP7 is a simple property specifying that nested actions cannot be composed
and vice-versa. However, it does not preclude composed actions from having
nested actions. Conversely, it does not restrict the roles of nested actions from
spawning composed actions. Property BP8 specifies that a valid system has
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no action nesting or composition cycle. It is a formal definition of property
BPB (Section 3.3). It considers a CA action-based design to be a graph where
actions are vertices and there is an edge between two arbitrary vertices A and
B if: (i) B ∈ {A}.NestedActions; or (ii) B ∈ ({A}.Roles).ComposedActions.
If there is a cycle in this graph, the system is considered invalid. In the table,
the “*” and “˜” operators stand for transitive closure and the inverse relation,
respectively.
4.2 Exception Flow
Exception flow is specified in terms of twelve different relations. Six of them
indicate how exceptions flow amongst actions:
• Internal ∈ Action ↔ RootException
• External ∈ Action ↔ RootException
• AbortException ∈ Action → RootException
• FailException ∈ Action → RootException
• Resolution ∈ Action → (POW (RootException)→ RootException)
• Excluding ∈ Action ↔ POW (RootException)
The remaining half dozen specify how exception flow works for roles of actions:
• Raises ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Generates ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Signals ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Masks ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Aborts ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Propagates ∈ Role → (RootException → RootException)
Relations AbortException, FailException, Resolution, and Propagates are
actually partial functions. In the rest of this subsection, we explain each of
these relations in more detail. We begin by describing the relations that pertain
to roles and later explain the ones that refer to actions.
Relations and properties pertaining to roles
We use two distinct relations to indicate the exceptions that each role is ca-
pable of handling. We are just interested in the effect the handler has on the
flow of exceptions, whether it stops exception propagation or not. Therefore,
modeling the behavior of the actual exception handlers is beyond the scope
of this work. The Masks relation specifies the exceptions that are masked
by a role. By “masked”, we mean that the component can take some action
that stops the propagation of the exception and makes it possible for the
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system to resume its normal activity. In the scope of cooperative concurrent
systems based on CA actions, an action A is capable of effectively mask-
ing an exception E if and only if, for every one of its roles R ∈ {A}.Roles,
E ∈ {R}.Masks. The Propagates relation describes exception handlers that
do not stop the propagation of exceptions. These handlers end their execu-
tion by signaling the same exception or a new one. Propagates specifies a
cause-consequence relationship between an exception that a role catches and
an exception that it signals. Given a role R and exceptions E and E ′, if
{E}.union({R}.P ropagates) = E ′, we say that role R propagates exception
E ′ from exception E and handles E by propagating it. The “union()” opera-
tor that appears above represents the generalized union over a set of sets. We
employ it to obtain a set of instances from a set of sets of instances of the
same type. For example, if Propagates = {R1 7→ {E1 7→ E2}, R2 7→ {E3 7→
E4}}, the expression {R1, R2}.P ropagates yields {{E1 7→ E2}, {E3 7→ E4}},
whereas union({R1, R2}.P ropagates) yields {E1 7→ E2, E3 7→ E4}.
When a role is not capable of appropriately handling an exception, it might
still be able to fail gracefully by returning to a state that is guaranteed to
be consistent, through some backward error recovery mechanism. The Aborts
relation indicates whether a role can perform backward error recovery upon
receipt of an exception. If, for a role R and an exception E, R 7→ E ∈ Aborts,
we say that role R aborts on exception E. Properties BP9, BP10, and BP11
specify that the sets of exceptions that roles mask, propagate from, and abort
on are disjunct. Properties BP10 and BP11 are more complex than BP9 be-
cause Propagates is a Role → (RootException → RootException) function,
whereas Masks and Aborts are Role ↔ RootException relations. The “dom”
operator yields the domain of a relation.
The generic CA actions model uses three different relations to describe the
throwing of exceptions. The Raises relation lists the exceptions that each role
potentially raises within its parent action. The action treats these exceptions as
internal exceptions. Property BP12 defines this relation as the conjunction of
the exceptions each role generates and the external exceptions of the actions it
composes. The Generates relation specifies the exceptions that roles generate
when erroneous conditions are detected. These conditions are dependent on
the semantics of the application and on the assumed fault model. For reasoning
about exception flow, the error that caused an exception to be raised is not
important, just the fact that the exception was raised. Finally, the Signals
relation associates roles to the exceptions they throw when unable to mask a
resolved exception. The exceptions that a role signals are considered external
exceptions of the parent action. Property BP13 of Table 3 defines Signals in
terms of three relations: Masks, Propagates, and Resolution. The latter is
explained in the next subsection. Intuitively, the set of exceptions that a role
signals comprises: (i) the resolved exceptions that it does not handle (neither
by masking nor propagating); and (ii) the exceptions it propagates.
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Table 3
Properties that describe the valid flow of exceptions amongst the elements of a
system.
Property Constraint
BP9 Masks
⋂
Aborts = {}
BP10 Aborts
⋂
{R, E|R ∈dom(Propagates) ∧ E ∈dom(union({R}.P ropagates))} = {}
BP11 Masks
⋂
{R, E|R ∈dom(Propagates) ∧ E ∈dom(union({R}.P ropagates))} = {}
BP12 Raises = Generates
⋃
ComposedActions.External
BP13 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀R ∈ {A}.Roles • {R}.Signals = (ran(union({A}.Resolution)) \
{R}.Masks \ dom(union({R}.P ropagates)))
⋃
(ran(union({A}.Resolution))).(union({R}.P ropagates))
BP14 Internal = Roles.Raises
⋃
NestedActions.External
BP15 External = Roles.Signals
⋃
AbortException
⋃
FailException
BP16 ∀A ∈ Action • (∃E ∈ RootException • E ∈ran(union({A}.Resolution)) ∧
(∀R ∈ {A}.Roles • E ∈ {R}.Aborts)) ⇔ {A}.AbortException 6= {}
BP17 ∀A ∈ Action • (∃E ∈ran(union({A}.Resolution))•
¬(∃E′ ∈ RootException • {E}.union(({A}.Roles).P ropagates) = {E′}∧
((∀R ∈ {A}.Roles • E ∈dom(union({R}.P ropagates))) ∨E = E′)
) ∧ ¬(|({A}.Roles  {R}.Masks)  {E}|+ 2 ≤ |{A}.Roles|) ∧
E /∈ {A}.AbortException)⇒ |{A}.FailException| = 1
Relations and properties pertaining to actions
For actions, the most important relations pertaining to exception flow are
Internal and External. The Internal relation specifies which exceptions are
raised within each action. Conversely, External specifies what exceptions an
action signals to enclosing actions or spawning roles (in the case of composed
actions). Properties BP14 and BP15 of Table 3 provide definitions for the
Internal and External relations, respectively. The set of internal exceptions
of an action comprises the exceptions that its roles raise combined with the
external exceptions of its nested actions. The set of external exceptions of
an action is composed by the exceptions that its roles signal combined with
the exceptions on which it fails or aborts. Relation AbortException specifies
the exceptions on which the actions in the system are capable of aborting.
An actions aborts on an exception when it is unable to handle the exception,
but every one of its roles is capable of returning to a consistent state through
backward error recovery upon receipt of that exception. The FailException
relation associates actions to the exceptions that they signal when they fail.
An action fails when it is unable to signal an exception and does not imple-
ment a backward error recovery mechanism. Property BP16 of Table 3 defines
constraints on the AbortException relation. It specifies that the roles of an
action can perform backward error recovery upon receipt of a certain resolved
exception if an only if the action is capable of aborting. The fact that an action
A is capable of aborting is represented by associating it to some exception in
the AbortException relation.
As pointed out in Section 2, a resolved exception is an exception that results
from exception resolution, the process by which a set of concurrently raised
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exceptions is translated into a single exception representing multiple errors.
The exception resolution graph of an action maps each set of exceptions that
can be concurrently raised within the action to an exception that the roles
of the corresponding action can attempt to handle. The Resolution relation
specifies the exception resolution graph for each action in a system. It is pos-
sible that not all the combinations of exceptions that can be raised by each
role can actually be raised concurrently. For example, even though roles R1
and R2 raise exceptions E1 and E2, respectively, they never do so at the same
time. The Excluding relation explicitly states which potential combinations
of internal exceptions cannot be raised concurrently at runtime. This relation
is necessary because a valid action must work properly for any combination
of internal exceptions that can be concurrently raised, unless explicitly stated
otherwise. Exception resolution is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Property BP17 places constraints on the FailException relation. This prop-
erty specifies the sufficient conditions for the existence of an exception whose
purpose is to indicate the catastrophic failure of an arbitrary action A. More
specifically, it states that if the roles of A receive a resolved exception RE,
there is some exception E such that A 7→ E ∈ FailException if: (i) action
A does not abort on RE; (ii) upon receipt of RE, two or more roles of A
signal (do not mask) exceptions and these exceptions are distinct. The two
distinct exceptions may be signaled because (a) at least two different roles of
A, upon receipt of E, propagate distinct exceptions, or (b) at least one role
of A does not mask nor propagate E and at least another role propagates
a different exception upon receipt of E. The “” operator in property BP17
stands for domain restriction. Given a set S and a relation R, S R is the set
of ordered pairs x 7→ y of R whose “x” element is also an element of S . For
example, given S = {a, b} and R = {a 7→ c, e 7→ b, b 7→ f, d 7→ g}, the domain
restriction S R is the set of pairs {a 7→ c, b 7→ f}. In the same vein, the “”
operator stands for range restriction.
4.3 Exception Resolution
As we discussed in the previous section, the Resolution relation pertains to
exception flow. However, an exception resolution graph is a complex data
structure whose well-formedness depends on conditions that are not directly
related to exception flow. Therefore, we believe that it makes sense to sepa-
rately describe the predicates that specify valid exception resolution graphs
and their relationship with actions. We present these predicates in Table 4.
Property BP18 specifies that every action has an exception resolution graph.
Property BP19 imposes constraints on the domains of valid exception resolu-
tion graphs. It states that exception resolution within an action must involve
only exceptions that the roles of the action can actually raise, or external ex-
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Table 4
Properties specific to exception resolution graphs.
Property Constraint
BP18 Action =dom(Resolution)
BP19 ∀A ∈ Action•union(dom(union({A}.Resolution))
⋃
{A}.Excluding)
⊆ ({A}.Roles).Raises
⋃
({A}.NestedActions).External
BP20 ∀A ∈ Action•dom(union({A}.Resolution))
⋂
{A}.Excluding = {}
BP21 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀ES ∈dom(union({A}.Resolution))
⋃
{A}.Excluding•
let RE = {RR|RR ∈ POW (({A}.Roles  Raises)  ES)},
NE = {NN |NN ∈ POW (({A}.NestedActions  Exernal) ES)}•
∃ER ∈ RE, EN ∈ NE • |ER|+ |EN | = |ES| ∧ ran(ER)
⋃
ran(EN) = ES
(∀r ∈dom(ER) • |{r}.ER| = 1) ∧ (∀e ∈ran(ER) • |ER.{e}| = 1) ∧
(∀e ∈dom(EN) • |EN.{e}| = 1) ∧ (∀e ∈ran(EN) • |EN.{e}| = 1)
BP22 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀ES ∈ POW ({A}.Internal)•
ES ∈dom(union({A}.Resolution)) ∨ ES ∈ {A}.Excluding
ceptions of its nested actions. The same applies for sets of exceptions explicitly
excluded from exception resolution, as specified by the Excluding relation.
Property BP20 states that a set of exceptions cannot at the same time be
resolved by an action’s exception resolution graph and be excluded from it.
Property BP21 of Table 4 is a formal specification of property BPC of Sec-
tion 3.3. It states that, for any set ES of concurrently raised exceptions in the
exception resolution graph of an action A, each exception in the set must have
been raised by a different role or nested action of A and none of them may
have contributed more than one element to ES. This property guarantees that
exception resolution graphs are consistent, i.e., they do not depict impossible
situations, such as a single role raising two or more exceptions at the same time
(though it might potentially raise many different exceptions). Property PB21
uses a special keyword, “let”, to define a macro. This notation means that,
wherever the comma-separated identifiers immediately following the “let” key-
word appear in the rest of the predicate, they should be replaced by the ex-
pressions following the “=” operator, respectively. For example, in property
BP21, the expression {RR|RR ∈ POW (({A}.RolesRaises)ES)} should
be used wherever the identifier RE appears.
We present an example to make property BP21 more concrete. Given an action
A1, roles R1, R2, R3, and exceptions E1, E2, E3, E4, let’s assume the following:
• {A1}.Roles = {R1, R2, R3},
• {A1}.NestedActions = {}
• Raises = {R1 7→ E1, R2 7→ E2, R2 7→ E3, R3 7→ E4}
• Excluding = {}
In this setting, if dom(union({A1}.Resolution)) = { {E1}, {E2}, {E3}, {E4},
{E1, E2}, {E1, E3}, {E1, E4}, {E2, E4}, {E3, E4}, {E1, E2, E4}, {E1, E3, E4} },
then A1 would be valid according to BP21, since: (i) every possible combination
of concurrently raised exceptions is contemplated by the exception resolution
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graph; and (ii) it does not include any combinations of exceptions that cannot
be concurrently raised. However, if the set {E1, E2, E3} was also an element of
dom(union({A1}.Resolution)), the resolution graph of A1 would not be valid
because exceptions E2 and E3 cannot be raised concurrently, since only role
R2 raises them and it can only raise one exception at a time.
5 Case Studies
In this section we present two case studies we have conducted in order to
assess the proposed approach. The first one consists of the application of
the proposed approach to one of the CA actions of the well-known Fault-
Tolerant Production Cell system [35,36], which has been thoroughly studied
in the CA action literature [37,15,38,16]. The second case study examines the
usefulness of the proposed approach to formally model and verify the informal
CA action-based design of an embedded control system to treat patients with
diabetes. The system, named the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy has
strict dependability requirements [39].
5.1 Fault-Tolerant Production Cell
The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell is a control system for a factory responsi-
ble for the production of forged metal plates. The production cell comprises six
electro-mechanical devices [36]: two conveyor belts (a feed belt and a deposit
belt), an elevating rotary table, two presses, and a rotary robot that has two
orthogonal extensible arms equipped with electromagnets. These devices are
associated with a set of sensors that provide useful information to a controller
and a set of actuators via which the controller can manage the whole system.
The task of the cell is to get a metal blank from its “environment” via the
feed belt, transform it into a forged plate by using a press, and then return it
to the environment via the deposit belt.
As mentioned previously, various case studies presenting CA action-based
designs of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell have appeared in the litera-
ture [37,15,38,16]. Therefore, it is natural that we use at least part of it as
a case study to illustrate our own approach to developing CA action-based
systems. To keep the presentation brief, we focus on a single CA action, Load-
Press1, and the actions nested within it. This action was partially explained
elsewhere by Xu and colleagues [36]. We leverage their partial description of
the system to serve as a basis for the application of the proposed approach to
LoadPress1.
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Fig. 3. Schematic view of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell.
Fig. 4. Partial CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell.
CA Action-Based Design
The LoadPress1 CA action controls the extensible arms of the robot in or-
der to get a blank from the rotary table and put it on press #1 (hereafter
called Press1). Figure 4 shows a schematic depiction of this CA action. For
simplicity, it does not depict accesses to shared resources or interactions be-
tween participants. The structure of the action indicates the workflow of its
execution. First, the robot rotates to a position where it can get a blank from
the table, uses the magnet of its first arm to get the blank, and rotates to
a position where it can reach Press1 (CA action RotateRobot). At the same
time, Press1 moves to its middle position so that it can receive the blank (CA
action MovePress1ToMiddle). The robot then extends its first arm and drops
the blank on Press1 (CA action ExtendArm1). After that, it retracts the arm
and returns to its original position (CA action RetractArm1).
Many different types of exceptions can occur within LoadPress1. These ex-
ceptions are related to either the robot or the press. As shown in Figure 3,
the production cell involves two presses. For simplicity, we consider that the
second press is redundant and only activated when the first one fails, in order
to keep the processing of metal blanks from stopping. In practice, however,
one would expect the two cells to work concurrently, so that failure of one of
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Table 5
Exceptions in the CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell.
Exc. Description
E1 Failure of the robot’s position or rotary sensors.
E2 Retract or extend motor does not respond.
E3 Arm 1 magnet fails.
E4 Robot’s rotary motor fails.
E5 The robot has a stuck or lost blank.
Arm1Failure Generic exception type to denote a failure of
the first arm of the robot
E6 Failure of Press1’s blank or position sensors.
E7 Press1’s motor fails.
E8 Press1 has a stuck or lost blank.
Press1Failure Generic exception type to denote a failure of Press1
the presses would result in a degraded service mode.
Based on our assumptions, the system is able to successfully mask failures of
one of the presses. For the other system components, however, an error means
that the production cell is unable to perform. In these cases, error handlers
attempt to avoid catastrophic failure by leaving the cell in a safe state, e.g.,
robot arms retracted, robot turned off, presses turned off, etc. Whenever an
exception propagates to a top-level CA action, an alarm will be activated
to notify the human operators of the error. Table 5 presents the exceptions
that potentially occur within LoadPress1. Exception E2 was originally “retract
motor fails”. However, since the robot arms have motors for both retracting
and extending, we have complemented the original description. For brevity, in
the model of Figure 4 and in the rest of this section, we assume that only four
amongst the 10 exceptions of Table 5 are internal to CA action LoadPress1:
E1, E3, E6, and E8. Also, we assume that at most two exceptions can be raised
concurrently within LoadPress1 and that no exceptions can be raised within
the CA actions nested within LoadPress1.
Applying the Proposed Approach
We modeled CA action LoadPress1 in B using the proposed approach. The
specification snippet in Figure 5 presents part of the resulting specification.
The specification above is written in the Abstract Machine Notation [25], an
ASCII notation for B. The MACHINE clause specifies the name of the B machine,
i.e., of the (sub)system that this specification models. The SETS clause specifies
the possible types of elements in a model by means of B’s carrier sets. A carrier
set in B defines a set of data elements whose internal representation is not
important. In our approach, we employ carrier sets to define both types of
structural element (actions, roles, participants) and exceptions. A B carrier
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MACHINE FTProdCell
/* System descriptions should modify the elements of
the sets ACTION, PARTICIPANT, ROLE, and
ROOT_EXCEPTION and the initialization. */
SETS
ACTION = {LoadPress1,...};
ROLE = {RobotSensor, RobotArm, ...};
ROOT_EXCEPTION={E1, E3, Arm1Failure, GeneralFailure,...};
PARTICIPANT = {P1, P2, ...}; ...
VARIABLES
Internal, External, Roles, NestedActions,
Signals, Raises,...
INVARIANT
Roles:ACTION <-> ROLE & External:ACTION <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Resolution:ACTION +-> (POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION)
+-> ROOT_EXCEPTION) & ...
INITIALISATION
Roles := {LoadPress1|->RobotSensor,
LoadPress1|->RobotArm,...} ||
External := {LoadPress1|->Arm1Failure,
LoadPress1|->GeneralFailure,...} ||
Internal := {LoadPress1|->E1, LoadPress1|->E3,...} ||
NestedActions := {LoadPress1|->RotateRobot,...} ||
Resolution := {LoadPress1|->{{E3, E6}|->GeneralFailure,
{E1, E3}|->Arm1Failure,...}} ||
Signals := {RobotArm|->GeneralFailure,
RobotArm|->Arm1Failure,...} ||
Raises := {RobotArm|->E3,...} ||
Generates := {RobotArm|-> E3,...} ||
Excluding := {LoadPress1|->{E1, E6, E8},...} || ...
OPERATIONS
...
END
Fig. 5. B specification of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell.
set is akin to the given sets of Z [26]. The SETS clause in the specification
above states that there is one action in the system called LoadPress1, two
roles named RobotSensor and RobotArm, and so on.
The VARIABLES clause, which in B is employed to specify variables of a model,
specifies the relations defining the proposed exception flow model. Typing con-
straints for these variables are specified by the INVARIANT clause. For example,
it states that Roles is an Action ↔ Role relation. Both clauses are part of
the generic CA actions model. The INITIALISATION clause assigns values to
the variables defined under VARIABLES. In the example above, it states that
action LoadPress1 has roles named RobotSensor and RobotArm. It also states
that LoadPress1 has at least two external exceptions: GeneralFailure and
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Arm1Failure. We briefly explain our use of the OPERATIONS clause later in
this section.
Since we have applied the proposed approach to a partial (purposefully in-
complete) specification [36], some of the problems we encountered might have
been addressed in subsequent works on the Fault Tolerant Production Cell.
Nonetheless, we emphasize that the application of the proposed approach did
point out the several places where the the authors left out relevant pieces of
the system specification or forgot important information. For example, the
original specification does not clarify what should be done in case more than
one device fails concurrently (e.g. Press1 fails and the robot fails as well). How-
ever, this is a real possibility according to the structure of the system (e.g. E1
and E8 from Figure 4 could be raised concurrently within LoadPress1) and our
generic CA actions model requires that this case be addressed. Therefore, we
introduced an additional exception, named GeneralFailure, that is signaled by
LoadPress1 to its enclosing context. As its name indicates, it signals a gener-
alized failure in the production cell (e.g. because both the press and the robot
failed).
Additionally, the application of the proposed approach highlighted the need
to understand how the internal and external exceptions of LoadPress1 relate.
For example, the action has an external exception named Press1Failure and
an internal one named press1 failure .It is not clear though, from the system
specification, what each one means and, most importantly, what (if any) is the
causality relation between them. We claim that the proposed approach high-
lighted this question because it requires us to explicitly indicate what internal
exceptions, when raised, might result in the signaling of a given external ex-
ception. If this kind of information is not present in a B specification adhering
to the proposed approach, ProB will complain during verification.
We specified the basic properties of the generic CA actions model in B under
the OPERATIONS clause of the B machine. Each operation evaluates a guarded
condition (corresponding to the conjunction of some of the basic properties)
and, in case it is true, assigns the value “yes” to an auxiliary variable, and “no”
otherwise. Under the INVARIANTS clause, we specify an invariant that says
that each such auxiliary variable must always have the value “yes”. Therefore,
if a basic property is violated, the value “no” will be assigned to one of the
auxiliary variables and ProB will point out an invariant violation. For example,
if we modify the specification presented above so that the role RobotArm raises
exception E3 but does not generate it, ProB detects an invariant violation due
to the following operation:
rolesConsistent =
IF !Act.((Act:ACTION) =>
!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]) => ...
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& (Raises[{R}] = External[ComposedActions[{R}]] \/
Generates[{R}])
) )
THEN RolesConsistent := yes
ELSE RolesConsistent := no
END;
The B snippet above defines an operation named rolesConsistent that does
not take any input parameters. The body of the operation consists of a guarded
command. The guard specifies that, for every action Act and every role R of Act
(operator “!” indicates universal quantification), the set of exceptions that R
raises comprises the exceptions that it generates combined (\/ is the set union
operator) with the set of exceptions signaled by actions that it composes. If the
guard evaluates to true, the value “yes” is assigned to the RolesConsistent
auxiliary variable, indicating that no invariant violations occurred. Otherwise,
the variable receives the value “no”, signaling a violation. In the example
above, the notation A[{B}], where B is a single element and A is a relation, is
equivalent to {B}.A, where “.” represents relational join.
The B snippet below presents the specification of basic property BP16 (Sec-
tion 4.2). This predicate specifies that, if all the roles in an action Act can
perform backward error recovery upon receipt of a certain resolved exception,
then the action is capable of aborting. In our generic CA actions model, this
is represented by the existence of some pair { Act 7→ E } ∈AbortException,
where E is an exception.
IF !Act.( (Act : ACTION) => ...
& (#E.(E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}])) &
(!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}])=> E:Aborts[{R}]))
) => (#AE.(AE:ROOT_EXCEPTION & AE = AbortException(Act)))
)
)
THEN ActionsConsistent := yes
ELSE ActionsConsistent := no
END;
The predicate above states that, for each action Act in a system, if there is an
exception in Act’s exception resolution graph to which some set of concurrently
raised exceptions is mapped to and that is in the Aborts set of every role of
Act, then there is some exception mapped to Act in AbortException. This
exception is signaled by Act to indicate to an enclosing action that it has failed
but was able to perform backward error recovery. Operator “#” represents
existential quantification in B.
In the process of planing, conducting, and analyzing the results of this case
study, we have reviewed several papers, technical reports, and implemented
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examples focusing on the production cell case studies. Nevertheless, we were
unable to find any example that specifies what the system should do when
three or more exceptions are raised concurrently within an action. At first,
we assumed that this was simply due to space constraints. A more in-depth
study, however, has shown a fundamental limitation in the use of CA actions.
In accordance to existing definitions of CA actions [17,10], our model requires
that developers either describe an exception resolution graph comprising every
combination of exceptions that can be concurrently raised within each action
in a system or explicitly specify the cases that cannot happen in practice.
This requirement of CA actions aims to improve fault tolerance, as it pro-
duces concurrent systems that are capable of gracefully handling any possible
combination of system errors. At the same time, though, it reduces the scala-
bility of CA actions, in general, and exception resolution graphs, in particular.
The size of the resolution graph grows combinatorially with the number of ex-
ceptions that can be raised concurrently within a given context. For example,
if we had included all the 8 internal exceptions of Table 5 (E1-8) in our model,
we would end up with more than 250 different combinations. Although there
are cases that cannot happen in practice (e.g. where the same role raises two
different exceptions in different moments), they still have to be addressed, one
by one, by the Excluding relation. We stress that this is not a problem spe-
cific to the proposed approach, but to the use of exception resolution graphs in
general. Our approach simply highlighted this limitation because it adheres to
the definition of CA actions and requires CA action-based designs contemplate
every possible combination of concurrently raised exceptions.
5.2 Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy
The Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy [39] (FTIPT) is a control sys-
tem with strict reliability requirements for treating patients with diabetes.
This system is based on the Continuous Subcutaneous Insulin Injection tech-
nique [39] and involves several sensors and actuators that must function con-
currently and continuously. These sensors and actuators are wearable devices
put on by patients under treatment. The dose of insulin administered by the
system includes two types of insulin: rapid action insulin (RAI) and long action
insulin (LAI).
Sensors and actuators exchange information by means of wireless communi-
cation channels. Sensors send information about the vital signs of a patient
to a server located in a hospital. The latter forwards this information to a
doctor who defines the amount of insulin to inject. The server then communi-
cates with the actuators which use pumps to administer the established dose
of insulin.
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Fig. 6. CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy.
Both sensors and actuators may fail. Sensors can fail by stopping to send
information about a patient’s vital signs. However, when they do send infor-
mation, the latter is assumed to be correct. Actuators can also fail in the same
manner. Moreover, they may fail because there is not enough insulin to apply
the required dose. Whenever an error is detected, treatment is interrupted and
an alarm located in a remote emergency room is activated. We assume that
the wireless channels do not fail.
CA Action-Based Design
Capozucca et al [39] use CA actions to design and implement the FTIPT.
The system is organized as a set of actions that structure the execution of
sensors and actuators. Coordinated exception handling is used as the main
fault tolerance mechanism, since it is not possible to roll back when insulin is
administered to a patient. The CA action-based design devised by the authors
is informal and specified by means of diagrams and textual descriptions.
Figure 6 shows the a diagram representing the system. For simplicity, it does
not depict accesses to shared resources or interactions between participants.
CA action CAA Cycle controls the overall execution of the system and deter-
mines the amount of insulin that must be injected for each pump based on the
patient’s vital signs. Actions CAA Sensors and CAA Actuators are spawned by
roles ControllerChecking and ControllerExecuting of actions CAA Checking and
CAA Executing, respectively. They are responsible, respectively, for collecting
the vital signs of the patient and administering the insulin. Each of these com-
posed CA actions has three roles. Roles A RAIP and A LAIP of CAA Actuators
spawn the composed CA actions CAA RAIP and CAA LAIP, respectively. The
latter two control the two pumps that will administer the two types of insulin.
Seven different types of exceptions can be raised in the system (Table 6). For
most of these errors, exception handling consists of stopping the treatment
and activating the alarm in the emergency room. In some cases, such as when
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Table 6
Exceptions in the CA action-based design of the FTIPT.
Exc. Description
E1 Heart Rate (HR) sensor does not respond.
E2 Blood Glucose (BGC) sensor does not respond.
E3 Delivery limit reached.
E4 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) does not respond.
E5 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) stops during delivery.
E6 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) does not respond.
E7 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) stops during delivery.
the value of a sensor cannot be obtained, the handler will try again once before
giving up.
Applying the Proposed Approach
We have modeled the CA action-based design described in the previous section
in Alloy. The specification snippet in Figure 7 shows part of the Alloy speci-
fication of the system. Its complete specification is available elsewhere [32].
In Alloy, a signature (sig keyword) specifies a type. The one keyword indi-
cates that a signature has exactly one instance 1 . We use signatures for mod-
eling actions, roles, participants, and exceptions (signature Key is explained
later on). Additional information is associated to these elements by means
of relations (Section 3.2). These relations are explicitly instantiated by facts,
predicates that the AA must assume to be true when evaluating constraints.
For instance, fact SystemStructure in the snippet above states, among other
things, that CA action CAAChecking has two roles, ControllerChecking
and ParamsChecking, and no nested actions. It also states that participant
P1 performs the roles ControllerChecking and ControllerCycle of ac-
tions CAAChecking and CAACycle, respectively. Moreover, fact ExceptionFlow
states, among other things, that roles BGC and HR raise exceptions E1 and
E2, and that the latter are internal exceptions of CA action CAASensors.
The open clause in the beginning of the specification imports the definitions
of the basic types of the proposed model, Action, Role, Participant, and
RootException. Moreover, it imports the predicates that specify the basic
properties of CA actions and some predefined desired properties.
Fact ExceptionResolution in the specification above describes the exception
resolution graph of the FTIPT. It uses subtypes K1 and K2 of signature Key
1 In Alloy, a type is simply a set of instances. Moreover, for the sake of uniformity
and ease of use, Alloy treats instances (single elements) as unitary sets. Therefore, a
singleton type can be treated as an instance of itself in a specification. For example,
signature CAACycle defines both the homonym type and its sole instance.
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//Imports generic CA actions model
open CoordinatedExceptionHandling
//CA actions extend ‘‘Action’’, roles extend ‘‘Role’’,
//exceptions extend ‘‘RootException’’, etc.
one sig CAACycle, CAAChecking, CAASensors,
CAAExecuting extends Action{}
one sig ControllerChecking, ParamsChecking, S_CT, BGC,
HR extends Role {}
one sig E1, E2, E3 extends RootException {}
one sig P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 extends Participant {}
one sig K1, K2, K3 extends Key {}
... //Other declarations.
fact SystemStructure {
CAACycle.NestedActions = CAAChecking + CAAExecuting
CAACycle.Roles = ControllerCycle + ParamsCycle
+ Calculus
CAAChecking.Roles = ControllerChecking + ParamsChecking
no CAAChecking.NestedActions
ControllerChecking.ComposedActions = CAASensors
CAASensors.Roles = S_CT + BGC + HR
P1.RolesPlayed = ControllerCycle + ControllerChecking
...// Other definitions. }
fact ExceptionFlow {
CAASensors.Internal = E1 + E2
CAASensors.External = AlarmEXC
BGC.Generates = E1 && BGC.Raises = E1
HR.Raises = E2 && HR.Generates = E2
...// Other definitions. }
fact ExceptionResolution {
CAASensors.ToResolve = E1->K1 + E2->K2
CAASensors.Resolved = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC
...// Other definitions.}
Fig. 7. Alloy specification of the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy.
to associate internal and external exceptions of action CAASensors. Key is
an auxiliary signature defined in the Alloy version of the generic CA actions
model. It is necessary because the exception resolution graph of an action is
a function from sets of exceptions to exceptions. Since it is not possible to
define high order relations in Alloy, we used a pair of relations, one associat-
ing internal exceptions to keys (ToResolve), one key for each mapping, and
the other associating each key to an external exception (ResolvedTo). In the
snippet above, fact ExceptionResolution states that exceptions E1 and E2
are both resolved to exception AlarmEXC. We emphasize that this workaround
for specifying the exception resolution graph of an action is not necessary in
the B version of the generic CA actions model.
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Let us now discuss some positive experience we had while developing the for-
mal specification of the FTIPT case study. This work helped us in identifying
a number of shortcomings in the original informal description of the system.
These shortcomings were discovered when we were formalizing the system and
during verification.
According to the original system description, the handlers for exceptions E4
and E6 “must stop the delivery of insulin and ring the danger alarm”. Just
by reading this statement, though, it is not possible to know the CA action
that will be responsible for ringing the alarm when one of these exceptions
is raised. Even though we are not explicitly modeling the actual alarm, this
information is still relevant. If the alarm is to be activated by a CA action
other than the one where the exception was raised, an exception should be
propagated from the CA action where the error was detected to the one that
will ring the alarm. However, no such exception exists in the original design
of the system.
For simplicity, we could assume that some role in the CA action where an
exception is raised is responsible for ringing the alarm. However, this is not
the best option since it scatters the responsibility of activating the alarm
throughout the whole application, partially defeating the purpose of decom-
posing the system into actions. In the end, we decided to add a new exception
named AlarmEXC to the system specification. This exception is signaled by
actions CAASensors, CAARAIP, and CAALAIP and propagated all the way up
to CAACycle, where it is handled. Later, discussing the matter with the au-
thors of the original case study, we discovered that, to our surprise, that was
actually what they meant. To explicitly capture the idea that AlarmEXC can
only be handled by CAACycle, we have specified this constraint as the follow-
ing application-specific property. Assuming the basic properties hold, it states
that, for any action other than CAACycle, if AlarmEXC is an internal exception,
it is also external. Moreover, it states that CAACycle handles AlarmEXC.
(AlarmEXC in CAACycle.Masks)
&& (all A:(Action - CAACycle)
| AlarmEXC in A.Internal => AlarmEXC in A.External)
After finishing the specification of the system in Alloy, we tried to verify the
basic CA action properties using the AA. In a couple of seconds, the latter
presented a counterexample indicating that the specification failed to satisfy
some property of interest. Careful study of the counterexample revealed that
property BP21 of the previous section was being violated. This problem hap-
pened because the case where exceptions E1 and E2 are raised concurrently
in action CAASensors was not covered by the exception resolution mechanism
of the action. This is a direct violation of basic property BP22 (Section 4.3)
To fix the specification, we extended the action’s resolution mechanism so
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that, when these two exceptions are raised concurrently, they are resolved to
AlarmEXC. However, discussing this problem with the authors of the original
case study we found out that these two exceptions are actually never raised
concurrently in practice. Hence, we modified the Alloy specification to say ex-
plicitly that E1 and E2 are never raised concurrently in CA action CAASensors.
The generic CA actions model defines a relation, Excluding, whose goal is to
exclude from the exception resolution graph of an action combinations of in-
ternal exceptions that are never raised concurrently. This relation is already
taken into account by the basic CA properties defined by the generic CA ac-
tions model. By default, no combinations are excluded. The following line was
introduced in the specification of the system:
CAASensors.Excluding = (E1 + E2) -> K3
6 Related Work
Several models have been proposed for formalizing the CA action concept
with the intention either to give a more complete and rigorous description of
the concept or to verify systems designed using CA actions. In this section
we briefly describe the most significant amongst these formalizations, com-
paring them to our own work. The COALA framework [17] was proposed to
allow system developers to model complex distributed/concurrent systems.
Within this work a formalization of the CA action concept is developed using
CO-OPN/2 [40], an object-oriented language based on Petri nets and partial
order-sorted algebraic specifications. Although CO-OPN/2 specifications are
amenable to mechanical verification (through translation to “regular” Petri
Nets), no attempt has been made to specify systems properties or verify sys-
tems described in COALA. The main goal of the authors was to devise a
semantically precise specification language for CA actions.
The ERT model (ERT stands for extraction, refusals, and traces) is used
for formalizing the CA action concept [41]. Refusals and traces are terms
that come from semantic models of CSP; term extraction refers to a specific
technique used to relate systems specified at different levels of abstraction.
This model does not have as strong a focus on exception flow as ours. Hence,
there are many properties that we can verify, specially those pertaining to
exception resolution, that cannot be directly specified using the ERT-based
model.
A mathematical framework, based on Timed CSP, for representing the use of
CA actions in real-time safety-critical systems is proposed in [42]. It allows
the interactions between concurrently functioning pieces of equipment to be
modeled - and their behavior to be reasoned about - in an abstract way. The
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framework models dynamic system structuring using CA actions and explicitly
uses events representing synchronization between items and the control system
to allow the action context to be changed dynamically. The framework was
not developed for dealing with erroneously behaving action participants, unlike
our approach. However, it helps to provide a better understanding of the CA
action concept and can be used in developing general models incorporating
mechanisms that support system safety.
Tartanoglu and colleagues [43] have devised a formalization for CA actions
using the B method. More specifically, they have formalized part of a CA
actions middleware infrastructure. This work is complementary to ours in the
sense that it focuses on an issue that we do not tackle: the dynamic structure
of CA actions, e.g. joining of participants, start and end of nested CA actions,
etc. The authors provide only a sketch, though, of how they address issues
such as exception flow and resolution. Moreover, they do not discuss how to
model CA action-based applications using their approach, nor how to conduct
automated verification.
The concept of Dependable Multiparty Interactions (DMIs) [16] has many
similarities with that of CA actions, and is formally specified using Temporal
Logic of Actions [44] (TLA). There were several earlier attempts to specify
the CA action semantics using TLA (for example, the one reported in [45]).
However, none of them has been used to mechanically verify whether a system
model satisfies certain properties of interest. In another work [46], Bertolini
and colleagues modeled DMIs using Stochastic Automata Networks, a formal-
ism based on Markov chains. This formalization is complementary to ours, as
it focuses on the throughput of a DMI-based system, specially when failures
occur periodically.
Xu and colleagues [47] use a formal approach to model and verify a safety-
critical systems designed using CA actions. To model-check the system con-
trolling a fault-tolerant Production Cell, the state transition system corre-
sponding to a CA action-based design is expressed in SMV (Symbolic Model
Verifier) [48] and the properties of the system to be analyzed are expressed in
CTL. This work has a strong emphasis on the execution order of CA actions
in a system. The authors also model the exception resolution graph for the CA
actions they design, but the approach they propose does not include means
to verify, for example, whether a resolution graph is valid. Nevertheless, this
work is also complementary to ours, as it models aspects of CA action-based
systems that ours does not.
In a recent work [49], Capozucca and colleagues describe a framework for im-
plementing systems based on CA actions. Their framework, CAA-DRIP, is an
evolution of the DRIP framework proposed by Zorzo and Stroud [38]. Com-
plementing the description of CAA-DRIP, the authors also present a partial
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formalization of CA actions based on statecharts [50]. The formalization fo-
cuses only on the overall states in which a CA action can be, without delving
into more convoluted mechanisms of CA actions, such as the structuring of
the actions that compose a system and exception resolution.
In a previous work [51], some of us have described an approach to design and
verify an architectural view [52] that centers on how exceptions flow amongst
architectural components. This work placed more emphasis on the effect that
different architectural styles [53] have on exception propagation than on the
verification of properties pertaining to exception flow. Moreover, it did not deal
with software systems where multiple exceptions might be raised concurrently
within the same exception handling context.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared elsewhere [54]. It did not ex-
plain the generic CA actions model (neither formally nor informally), pre-
sented only one case study, did not show how the proposed approach can be
instantiated to the B notation, and did not discuss related work. In another
previous work [20], some os us have defined a formal exception flow model for
non-distributed software architectures. Although we used a similar approach
for the definition of this previous model (a generic model + applications adher-
ing to the model + mature verification tools), the generic model itself differs
greatly from the one we present in this paper. The most important difference
is that exception handling contexts are much more complex for cooperative
concurrent systems. In such systems, a context must involve all the processing
units that cooperate and exception handling should also be performed coop-
eratively. For non-cooperative systems, contexts are localized processing units
(i.e. exception handling concerns only a single component) and exceptions are
either handled within them or propagated to an outer context which is also
localized. Another significant difference is that exception propagation is much
more complex in an exception handling mechanism that involves cooperative
handling. This shows in many parts of the formal model and, particularly,
in Section 4.3, where we describe how exception resolution works. This issue
does not make sense for systems where only one exception at a time can be
raised within an exception handling context. Finally, it is important to stress
that this previous work did not include a case study, whereas in this paper we
present two extensive case studies.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an approach for specifying and verifying cooperative con-
current systems that use exception handling to achieve fault tolerance. This
approach aims at guaranteeing that the fault tolerance mechanisms used to
build a reliable system are also reliable. The main contribution of this paper
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is to provide a formalization of CA actions that makes it possible to auto-
matically check whether a CA action-based design satisfies several properties
of interest regarding exception handling. The usefulness of the proposed ap-
proach was demonstrated by two case studies. Even for simple applications,
the proposed approach helped us to uncover some implicit assumptions in the
original designs of the systems. The problems we found were directly related
to the use of exception handling. In other formal models for specifying CA
actions, it would be harder to spot problems like the ones we found because
they focus on different aspects of CA action-based systems, such as temporal
ordering of events [15] and dynamic CA action structuring [43].
This work does not address some important aspects of systems structured as
CA actions. For example, it is not possible to model consistent access to exter-
nal resources or the dynamic structure of nested actions. Moreover, this work
does not cover issues related to sychronization amongst action participants. In
the future, we intend to expand the system model used in our approach to ad-
dress these issues and provide a more comprehensive framework for verifying
CA action-based systems. More specifically, we intend to devise an approach
to separate the specifications of the CA actions middleware and CA action-
based applications. Moreover, we are currently working on a rigorous software
development methodology whose emphasis is on modeling the error handling
behavior of software systems. This methodology leverages the proposed ap-
proach for verification.
The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell case study has shown that the exception
resolution graph approach [11] for dealing with concurrently raised exceptions
is not scalable. This suggests that future research on exception handling for
concurrent systems should either pursue more scalable solutions for dealing
with the case where multiple exceptions are raised at the same time. Another
approach would be to guarantee that certain parts of an asynchronous system
are executed synchronously.
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